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We examine agricultural child labor in the context of emigration, transfers, and the abil-
ity to hire outside labor.  We start by developing a theoretical background based on 
Basu and Van, (1998), Basu, (1999) and Epstein and Kahana (2008) and show how hir-
ing labor from outside the household and transfers to the household might induce a re-
duction in children’s working hours. Analysis using Living Standards Measurement 
Survey (LSMS) data on the Kagera region in Tanzania lend support to the hypothesis 
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 Migration, Transfers and Child Labor   
1 Background 
According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), about 218 million children 
between the ages of 5 and 14 are working in developing countries, with 8.4 million in-
volved in especially hazardous work including prostitution, soldiering, forced and 
bonded labor, and other illicit activities. The negative implications of even the less haz-
ardous occupations on human capital accumulation, child and adult health and future 
outcomes such as labor market performance and intergenerational poverty traps is well 
documented (Basu, 1999; Basu and Chau, 2008; Edmond, 2008). 
The literature explaining child labor incidence in developing countries centers 
around (i) the need to employ children to meet the family’s very basic subsistence re-
quirements (Basu and Van, 1998; Basu, 1999), (ii) a response to the absence of credit 
markets (Baland and Robinson, 2000; Ranjan, 1999, 2001), and (iii) low returns to edu-
cation (Bacolod and Ranjan, 2006). Policy proposals emanating from this literature in-
clude the banning of child labor by developing countries and banning the import of 
products made with child labor by developed countries, improving credit markets, im-
posing minimum wage restrictions and providing income support to households. No 
single approach has managed to provide a tangible solution to the problem.  
Recent research has extended the stylized gamut of explanations and policy recom-
mendations in innovative directions. Taking as a starting point the view that child labor 
is a result of excess labor supply and subsistence constraints (Basu and Van, 1998), Ep-
stein and Kahana (2008) show that reducing the amount of labor available via out-
migration may enable children to stop working. The wage increase emanating from the 
fall in labor supply may also make it possible for parents in households without emi-
grants to withdraw their children from the labor force. This model provides a powerful 
new solution to the child labor problem by encouraging adult family members to emi-
grate.  
Much of the literature implicitly examines urban or at least nonagricultural activities 
and policies. However children have traditionally been an important part of farm work 
life. Moreover, there is evidence that many children worldwide and the majority of 
working children in Africa are employed on the farm, and missing or imperfect labor 
markets lead to child labor persistence even among the wealthiest land owners (Bhalotra 
and Heady, 2003; Bhalotra, 2003).  While not necessarily exploitative, agricultural child 
labor certainly interferes with childhood development, in particular, schooling, em-
ployment and marital status later in life (Beegle et al, 2008). Our simple household level 
model captures some of the agricultural peculiarities within which child labor takes 
place. Our results indicate that emigration and private transfers reduce child labor.   
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2 The model 
2.1 Without Migration 
A child works for a fraction   of the work day on the farm. We assume that an 
unskilled adult and a child are perfect substitutes in production, subject to an adult 
equivalence correction of 
[ 1 , 0 ∈ e ]
γ ,  1 0 < < γ  (Basu and Van, 1998; Ranjan, 1999; Epstein and 
Kahana, 2008). The child has negligible bargaining power in the household, and thus 
the parents, who both have the same preferences, decide whether to send their children 
to work. Parents are altruistically concerned with their children’s welfare. Household 
preferences are given by a Stone–Geary utility function (Basu and Van, 1998; Epstein 
and Kahana, 2008), 
     (1)  ,
if ,











s c s c
s c e s c
e c U
where   is household consumption and  is a parameter capturing a family’s needed 
level of consumption – only after achieving s can the family think about children’s edu-
cation. Consumption is equally divided among all household members. It is clear that if 
s is sufficiently high (as under severe poverty) there will be full child labor, e=1. 
c 0 > s
Parents work full time on the farm and their contribution to household farm produc-
tion is normalized to one. Household profit from working on the farm equals () e p γ + 1 , 
where p is the profit per unit of adult time and  e γ   is the equivalent adult time worked 
by the child. Assume the household receives transfers, T. The household maximizes 
utility,U , with respect to   subject to the budget constraint, [ 1 , 0 ∈ e ]
1 
  ( ) 1 cp e T γ = ++  (2) 
Maximizing utility given the budget constraint, we find,
2 
















=  (4) 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, we assume children allocate their time to either schooling or work and the only cost of 
schooling is children’s foregone earnings.  
2 Second order conditions are satisfied.  
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Here we see that there are two effects of increased household profits, p, per unit of 
time: (1) the opportunity cost of schooling rises; (2) the option of going to school be-
comes more realistic since the household has more funds. Thus, the effect an increase in 
the profit per unit of time is ambiguous. 












2.2 With Migration 
We now consider the child labor decision when a parent emigrates in response to higher 
wages elsewhere. Households may employ hired labor to replace the emigrating adult 
on the farm – after all, farm work needs to get done. Doing so increases the income of 
the farm (assuming the cost is lower than the benefit); however, it imposes a cost to the 
family members of having to supervise a stranger. Denote the time worked by the hired 
hand as f   and the cost of the hired hand as d. The decision to emigrate must 
take into consideration possible increased remittances and decreased other transfers, 
disutility household members experience from having hired labor – an outsider – in the 
household, and the disutility from migrating. The decision to migrate also affects the 
time the child works on the farm. The utility of the household with an emigrating parent 
is, 
( 1 0 ≤ ≤ f







≥ − − −
=
s c s c a
s c f e s c a
e c UI if
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The constant   represents a disutility from migration and hiring outside labor. 
The budget constraint becomes, 
1 0 ≤ < a
  ( ) R f d f e p c + − + = γ  (7) 
The gain for the household from the hired hand equals ( )f d p − ; the family also re-
ceives transfers at a level R. These transfers are a function of the wage the migrant ob-
tains, that is, , since they include all the transfers the household obtains – the re-
mittances the migrant sends home and other transfers (T). Note that as a migrant earns 
more and sends more remittances, the household may obtain fewer transfers from other 
places. 
) (w R
The household needs to make four decisions: emigrate or not, time the hired hand will 
be employed, the amount of remittances, and the time the child will work on the farm. We 
calculate the optimal time the household employs the hired hand and then calculate the 
optimal time for the child to work. The optimal time employing a worker equals,  
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Substituting (8) into (6) and (7) and calculating the optimal time the child works we 
obtain the equilibrium, 
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 (12) 
From (11) increasing transfers decreases child labor. Increasing wages may decrease 
the total amount of transfers from other sources but it is likely that total transfers (remit-
tances and other transfers) will increase. If this is the case than migrant wage decreases 
child labor.  
Substituting (10) into (8) the optimal time the hired worker is employed equals,  
  () ** 3( 1 ) (
2( )
dR s p p R s
f
dd p




We can see an increase in transfers, R, (and in wages if increasing w leads to a net 
increase in R) may increase or decrease the amount of time the hired hand is employed. 
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3 Empirical model 
Our theory tells us that child labor depends on migrants’ wages, transfers, hired labor, 
and, of course, other household characteristics and farm characteristics that have effect 
on productivity and profits on the farm. Unfortunately in our data we have no informa-
tion on wages received by emigrants. As we know that emigration is a positive function 
of destination wages, we proxy the migrants’ wages with the number of migrants from 
the household.  
  ε α α α α α + + + + + = 1 4 3 2 1 0 Z HiredLabor Transfers Migration labor Child    (16) 
The migration variable also captures the loss of migrant’s labor by the family, as well 
the disutility faced by the family because of emigrating household members. Transfers (R) 
capture the income effect produced by the all private transfers received by the family in 
the reference period. The null hypothesis is that migration and transfers, as well as hired 
laborers, have a negative impact on child labor supply ( 0 , 0 , 0 3 2 1 < < < α α α ).   
Our model also indicates that hired labor is a positive function of transfers and mi-
gration (which is a proxy for emigrant wages): 
  u Z Transfers Migrants laborers Hired + + + + = 2 3 2 1 0 δ δ δ δ    (17) 
Similarly, transfers are a function of migration and can be either positively or nega-
tively related to the number of migrants,  
  η β β β + + + = 3 2 1 0 Z Migration Tranfers    (18) 
Migration is presented in reduced form as,  
  ν γ γ + + = 4 1 0 Z Migration    (19) 
Equations 16 – 19 represent a fully recursive system. The Breusch-Pagan test con-
firms that the variance-covariance residual matrix for these equations is diagonal, thus 
giving empirical support to our presumption from our theoretical model that the system 
is recursive. Each equation is therefore estimated separately by OLS, which is the best 
linear unbiased estimator in this case (Johnson, 1984; Wooldridge, 2002). 
We estimate the system of equations 16 – 19 with and without controlling for yearly 
and village fixed effects. We control for head of household, household structure, wealth 
and other household and farm characteristics, which are fairly stylized in the child (and 
other agricultural) labor, migration and transfers literatures and which we assume exo-
genous. When we implement our estimation we choose identical Zi’s for every equation. 
A description of the variables is in Table 1. 
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4 Data and descriptive statistics 
We use 1991 – 1994 Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) data on the Kagera 
region in Tanzania, available from the World Bank. It consists of a panel of close to 800 
rural households for each year. Our analysis is restricted to the data on migration, trans-
fers, hired labor and child labor included in the 1992 – 1994 panels. We are able to 
track emigrants between any two consecutive cross-sections and information on mi-
grants is therefore not available in the first cross-sectional survey for 1991. After ac-
counting for missing observations, we are left with a sample of 2213 observations. 
Approximately 98% of households were engaged in agricultural production during 
the preceding year; for half, agriculture is the primary mode of subsistence. In close to 
half of the households at least one family member migrated between 1991 and 1994, 
and almost 83% of the households have received transfers at least occasionally.
3 The 
majority of children who work, work on farms and less than 2% of all children in the 
sample supply any off-farm labor. 
In Table 2 we provide some descriptive statistics for the entire pooled sample for 
1992 – 1994 that we use in our regression analysis. Columns 1 and 2 compare the sam-
ple of households that supply child labor with the sample of households that do not sup-
ply child labor; Columns 3 and 4 compare households who hired labor and households 
who did not hire labor; Columns 5 and 6 compare households who received transfers 
with households who did not receive transfers and Columns 7 and 8 compare the house-
holds from which at least one member migrated during the reference period with those 
from which nobody migrated.   
The descriptive statistics indicate that the probability of households’ not supplying 
child labor increases with transfers received and the amount of labor hired. We do not 
observe a significant impact of the number of migrants on the probability of child labor 
at the household level. In addition, we see that the presence of children of both sexes in 
both the less than 10 and 10 – 15 age groups increases the supply of child labor, while 
the presence of elderly people in the household decreases it. As expected, larger fami-
lies are more likely to supply child labor.  
The statistics also indicate that larger land sizes (shambas owned), farm capital (farm 
assets, that is machinery, animals used for production, etc.) availability and non-farm 
assets and non-farm labor opportunities in the form of a family business have a slight 
positive correlation with the supply of child labor on the farm. Looking at the character-
istics of households who produce migrants and receive monetary transfers, we see that 
both of these characteristics are in general associated with higher levels of human 
and/or physical capital of the household. For instance, we observe that higher education 
levels increase the probability of emigrating and the amount of transfers received. Fur-
thermore, larger family wealth in the form of durable assets has a strong association 
                                                 
3 We are not able to distinguish between remittances received from migrants and other private transfers 
received. Hence, we focus the total value of transfers received by the household, which is consistent with 
our theoretical model. Restricting transfer information to only that received by migrants’ families did not 
change our results. We use information on transfers received by both migrant and non-migrant families.  
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with both the probability of migration and the receipt of transfers and the same is true 
for the availability of a family business. At the same time, while larger land sizes, trade 
ownership and larger farm assets value are slightly positively associated with the prob-
ability of receiving transfers, there is no clear-cut association between these forms of 
wealth and migration. If anything, these forms of wealth are slightly negatively associ-
ated with the probability of migration. Hired labor is a positive function of migration 
and transfers. It is also a positive function of the education of the head of households, 
the land and capital endowments of the farm.  
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5 Empirical results 
Table 3 highlights the results from our empirical analyses. The first four columns of 
table 3 show the respective child labor, hired labor, transfer and migration results with-
out controlling for year and village fixed effects, while in the last four columns we high-
light the corresponding fixed effect estimates.  
In table 3 we see that the signs of both the migration and transfers variables are nega-
tive and significant, providing support for our main hypothesis that migration and trans-
fers reduce the supply of child labor by the households. However, the hired labor vari-
able is not significant at any conventional level. Our estimates also confirm the finding 
of the agricultural child labor literature that larger land ownership is positively corre-
lated with higher levels of child labor on the farm and the same is true the use of fertil-
izers. By contrast, off-farm employment opportunities in the form of trade and business 
decrease the supply of child labor. Trivially, larger household sizes and proportions of 
children in the households are positively related to higher levels of child labor supply. 
There is no direct impact of migration or transfers on hired labor. However, wealth-
ier households, namely those having higher levels of human capital, land, farm and non-
farm assets or business, as well as those able to afford fertilizers, are also able to hire 
more labor in the outside market. 
The results also indicate that households with younger heads are more likely to un-
dertake migration. In addition, the ownership of land, activity in trade, and owning a 
business, all decrease the production of migrants by the household. This is consistent 
with the evidence on out-migration from rural areas in developing countries (Lucas, 
1997). The same is true for farm characteristics, such as farm assets and the use of fer-
tilizers that improve the productivity on the farm. However, the ownership of non-farm 
durable assets stimulates emigration. Finally, higher youth dependency rates reduce 
migration, while higher old age dependency rates increase migration. 
The results on transfers are less clear-cut, and do not provide support to either of the 
usual tests in the transfers’ literature, namely altruism or exchange (Cox, 1987). How-
ever, it appears that better off households (e.g. those owning a business) are less likely 
to receive transfers. Interestingly, the presence of young girls reduces the probability of 
receipt of private transfers by the households.  
In sum, our results indicate that adult emigration and the receipt of private transfers 
may provide a powerful child labor alleviating mechanism. The links between migra-
tion, transfers, hired labor and child labor are complex as is the impact of various forms 
of human and physical capital on each of these variables. For instance, assets that im-
prove the productivity on the farm reduce the probability of migration, but also increase 
the supply of child labor on the farm. At the same time, higher levels of human capital 
and the development of off-farm labor opportunities, e.g. a family business, turn out to 
be powerful additional solutions to the agricultural child labor issue, which, as wit-
nessed by the growing literature on child welfare in agricultural economies, has severe 
negative implications for education and labor market performance later in life (Beegle 
et al, 2008). 
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6 Concluding remarks 
Development policy offers several different solutions to the child labor problem, includ-
ing banning either child labor or the import of products made by child labor, improving 
credit markets, imposing minimum wage restrictions or providing income support to 
households. As no single traditional approach has managed to provide a tangible con-
clusion to the child labor debate, we search for alternative solutions.  
We start with a heuristic theoretical model of child labor, migration, transfers and 
hired labor and show that migration, transfers and the ability of households to substitute 
for child labor with hired labor, can reduce the supply of child labor by the household. 
We examine this with the use of rich and high quality data on rural households from 
the Kagera region in Tanzania. The results from our empirical estimations support the 
hypotheses emanating from our theoretical model. We find migration and transfers can 
reduce the supply of child labor by an average household.  
We also observe that households with better human capital characteristics are more 
likely to both produce migrants and hire labor. At the same time, land ownership has a 
negative impact on migration and a positive impact on child labor, while the ownership 
of a business reduces both the probability of migrating and the supply of child labor. In 
other words, human capital development and the development of off-farm activities in 
the form of a functioning adult off-farm labor market and entrepreneurship appear to 
offer important complementarities to migration and the coping mechanisms of house-
holds.  
Migration has famously been an escape valve in classic development models, though 
not without negative implications for both sending and receiving areas. Here we see that 
migration can provide other important short-run and long-run benefits- reducing child 
labor and increasing schooling. This is true whether the migration is rural-to-urban or 
otherwise domestic or international. Migration restrictions, whether domestic or interna-
tional, hurt children and where there is a positive link between schooling and well-being 
and growth, hurt the economy over the long haul. Migration can bring net gains to both 
sending and receiving areas.  
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The weekly labor supply of children of less than 15 years of age in hours 
Total value of transfers received by the household during the preceding 6 
months (includes remittances by migrants and other transfers)  
Total number of household members who migrated during 1991-1994 
Proportion of females of less than 10 years of age 
Proportion of males of less than 10 years of age 
Proportion of females of 10-15 years of age 
Proportion of males of 10-15 
Proportion of females 16-59 years of age 
Proportion of females of 60 and more years of age 
Proportion of males of 60 and more years of age 
Dummy=1 if the head of household has any post primary education 
Age of the head of household 
Household size 
Number of shambas owned by the household 
Total present resale value of durables 
Total present resale value of farm assets (machinery, animals used for produc-
tion, etc.) 
Dummy=1 if the household hired any laborers 
Dummy=1 if the household used any fertilizer during the planting season 
Dummy=1 if the household owns a trade 
Dummy=1 if the household owns a business 
Note: all monetary values are in Tanzanian shillings/100000 
 
  
Table 2:   Descriptive household (HH) statistics 
  Children in HH worked  HH hired non-family labor   HH received transfers   Someone in HH migrated 
Variable  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Migrants  1.0405(1.5486)  1.0588(1.5925)  1.2610 (1.7944)  0.9407 (1.4281)  1.1199(1.5970)  0.7037(1.3712)     
Transfers/10000  1.0682(4.5710)  1.7619(23.0564)  2.5857 (26.8199)  0.7738 (3.9260)         
Hired labor days  28.7486 (183.5348)  35.0470 (217.7048)             
Pfage10  0.2441(0.2307)  0.2326(0.2572)  0.2427 (0.2354)  0.2369 (0.2469)  0.2407 (0.2378)  0.2298 (0.2674)  0.2213 (0.2368)  0.2548 (0.2476) 
Pmage10  0.3012(0.2823)  0.2706(0.3073)  0.3145 (0.2942)  0.2735 (0.2934)  0.2905 (0.2965)  0.2720 (0.2830)  0.2774 (0.2974)  0.2963 (0.2912) 
Pfage15  0.1990(0.2239)  0.0461(0.1236)  0.1310 (0.1927)  0.1290 (0.2041)  0.1278 (0.1935)  0.1384 (0.2304)  0.1282 (0.1931)  0.1310 (0.2067) 
Pmage15  0.2383(0.2506)  0.0812(0.1861)  0.1475 (0.2165)  0.1770 (0.2460)  0.1706 (0.2386)  0.1498 (0.2279)  0.1795 (0.2463)  0.1557 (0.2274) 
Pfage60  0.0806(0.1851)  0.1452(0.2926)  0.0994 (0.2289)  0.1153 (0.2483)  0.1108 (0.2399)  0.1060 (0.2523)  0.12256 (0.2612)  0.0984 (0.2226) 
Pmage60  0.0749(0.1660)  0.1302(0.2842)  0.0948 (0.2262)  0.1027 (0.2304)  0.1037 (0.2300)  0.0823 (0.2229)  0.1075 (0.2350)  0.0931 (0.2232) 
Headedu  0.0579(0.2336) 0.0448(0.2070) 0.0776  (0.2678)  0.0389  (0.1934) 0.0540(0.2260) 0.0423(0.2016) 0.0701(0.2555) 0.0354(0.1849) 
Headage 50.3772(15.2974)  48.4930(18.5915)  48.6399  (16.4081)  49.9720 (17.1242)  49.9853(16.9883)  47.2751(16.2635)  50.8919(16.7276) 48.2746(16.9551) 
Hhsize  8.2854(3.3465) 6.4402(3.5009) 8.1499  (4.0982)  7.0907  (3.1574) 7.7112(3.6151) 6.1720(2.8105) 8.8161(3.7063) 6.2021(2.8562) 
Shambown  2.4152(1.6947) 2.1783(1.5892) 2.8420  (1.9135)  2.6355  (1.4263) 2.3548(1.6757) 2.0794(1.5100) 2.3678(1.6482) 2.2530(1.6534) 
Durval/100000  0.5509(5.3662) 0.5808(3.6417) 1.3830  (7.8899)  0.1474  (0.7814) 0.6385(5.1045) 0.2049(0.8037) 0.9001(6.6001) 0.2586(1.2974) 
Fasset/100000 0.1205(0.8927)  0.0982(0.7347)  0.2194  (1.4065)  0.0549  (0.1016)  0.1193 (0.0924)  0.0674 (0.1636)  0.1072 (0.3974)  0.1133 (1.0753) 
Usedfertil  0.0397(0.1953)  0.0209(0.1432)  0.0549 (0.2279)  0.0191 (0.1369)  0.0322 (0.1765)  0.0265 (0.1607)  0.0341 (0.1816)  0.0285 (0.1665) 
Trade  0.0951(0.2935) 0.0956(0.2942) 0.0941  (0.2921)  0.0960  (0.2947) 0.1019(0.3026) 0.0635(0.2442) 0.0882(0.2836) 0.1019(0.3026) 
Business  0.3590(0.4799) 0.3904(0.4881) 0.4489  (0.4977)  0.3349  (0.4721) 0.3913(0.4882) 0.2857(0.4524) 0.4076(0.4916) 0.3420(0.4746) 
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Table 3:   Regression results: OLS 
  No fixed effects  Village and year fixed effects included 
  Child labor  Hired Labor  Transfers Migrants  Child  labor  Hired labor  Transfers  Migrants 
Hired Labor  -0.0005  
(0.0015) 
     -0.0000 
(0.0015) 
   






















































































































































































































































































Rsq  0.2515 0.2014  0.0221  0.3284 0.2922 0.2014 0.0221 0.32842 
N  Obs.  2213 2213  2213  2213 2213 2213 2213 2213 
Note: ***. ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in brackets are stan-
dard errors. 
  12  Migration, Transfers and Child Labor   
  13
References 
Bacolod, Marigee P. and Ranjan, Priya. “Why Children Work, Attend School, or Stay Idle: The 
Roles of Ability and Household Wealth.” Mimeo, University of California –Irvine, 
July 2006. 
Baland, Jean-Marie and Robinson, James (2000). “Is Child Labor Inefficient?” Journal of Po-
litical Economy, vol 108(4), pp. 663-679. 
Basu, Arnab and Chau, Nancy H. (2008). “Child Labor" in Vince Parillo (ed) Encyclopedia of 
Social Problems, Sage Publications, New Jersey. 
Basu, Kaushik and Van, Pham Hoang. “The Economics of Child Labor.” American Economic 
Review, June 1998, 88(3), pp. 412-27. 
Basu, Kaushik. “Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International 
Labor Standards.” Journal of Economic Literature, September 1999, 37(3), pp. 
1083-1119. 
Basu, Kaushik. “The Intriguing Relation Between Adult Minimum Wage and Child Labor.” The 
Economic Journal, March 2000, 110(462), pp. C50-C61. 
Beegle, Kathleen, Dehejia Rajeev, Gatti Roberta and Krutikova Sofya (2008). “The conse-
quences of child labor. Evidence from longitudinal data in rural Tanzania”. Policy 
Research Working Paper Series 4677, The World Bank. 
Bhalotra, Sonia and Christopher Heady. “Child farm labour. The wealth paradox”, World Bank 
Economic Review, 2003, 17(2), pp.197-227. 
Bhalotra, Sonia. “Child labour in Africa”, OECD Social Employment and Migration Working 
Papers No. 4. 
Cox, Donald, “Motives for private transfers”, Journal of Political Economy, 1987, 95, 508-46. 
Edmonds, Eric (2008). Child Labor. Handbook of Development Economics Volume 4. Shultz, 
Paul and Strauss, John (eds.), pp. 3607-3709. 
Epstein. Gil S. and Nava Kahana, “Child Labor and Temporary Emigration” Economics Letters, 
2008, 99(3), pp. 545-548. 
Lucas, Robert, “Internal Migration in Developing Countries”, Handbook of Population and 
Family Economics 1B, Rosenzweig, Mark and Stark, Oded (eds). pp. 721-98. 
Ranjan, Priya. “An Economic Analysis of Child Labor.” Economics Letters, 1999, 64 (1), pp. 
99-105. 
Ranjan, Priya. “Credit Constraints and the Phenomenon of Child Labor.” Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 2001, 64(1), pp .81-102. 
 
 
 
 
 
 